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The public debt of low-income countries is increasing 
significantly, with the ratio of public debt service costs 
to government tax revenue likely to exceed 30% in a 
third of low-income countries. This could reduce their 
ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to 
lead an economic recovery that responds to climate 
change and supports the Sustainable Development 
Goals. Rapid and sufficient international debt relief for 
countries that need it is therefore an urgent priority. This 
needs to take into account the changed structure of 
debt and the diversity of lenders. An important change 
in the structure of this debt is that both Chinese and 
private creditors, especially bondholders, have rapidly 
increased their share of credit to emerging economies. 
This paper analyses the extent of the growing debt 
crisis in low-income economies – particularly in Africa, 
its complex and diverse nature, and the implications for 
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Summary 
In October 2020, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) projected that the sovereign debt-to-GDp ratio 
in emerging market and developing economies would 
increase by more than 10%, due to the direct and 
indirect impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, to about 
65% of GDp by the end of 2021 – the highest level 
on record. It also estimated that the ratio of public 
debt service costs to government tax revenue would 
exceed 30% in almost a third of low-income developing 
countries in 2020, with the number of these countries 
increasing in 2021 (IMF 2021). 
The G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) 
initiative, promoted by the World Bank and IMF, aims 
to free up countries’ financial resources to combat 
and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. In all, 
73 low-income countries (LICs) and lower middle-
income countries (LMICs) are eligible for a temporary 
suspension of debt-service payments. Although the 
DSSI initiative focuses on countries eligible for support 
from the International Development Association (IDA), 
the features and composition of these countries’ public 
debt varies greatly. First, the 29 LICs report lower total 
levels of public debt compared to the LMICs. Second, 
the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are much more 
severe in the LICs, because of their higher vulnerability 
and the already poor state of health and welfare systems 
in those countries, as well as higher levels of poverty. 
Third, if sufficient debt relief is not provided to debt-
distressed LICs, they will be forced to adjust their 
economies even more than currently, which will slow the 
recovery process and undermine progress on achieving 
the SDGs and responding to climate change.
It is key for the international community to swiftly take 
action to provide sufficient debt relief to the low-income 
countries that need it because their debt burdens 
have become unsustainable. Doing ‘too little too late’, 
as happened in past crises, such as those in Latin 
America in the 1980s and sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1980s and 1990s, could set development back in those 
regions, with major reversals to growth, investment 
and employment. As uN Secretary General Antonio 
Guterres recently told the Financial Times, “The 
response to Covid and to the financial aspects [of the 
crisis] has been… too limited in scope and too late” 
(Wheatley 2021).
It is also essential that these low-income countries 
allocate sufficient resources for climate adaptation, 
mitigation and resilience, and biodiversity conservation. 
But this will not be possible if their debt burdens are 
excessive. Therefore, sufficient debt relief should be 
channelled to increased investment in a low-carbon and 
inclusive recovery in countries with unsustainable debt.
This paper analyses the extent of the growing debt crisis 
in low-income economies, particularly in Africa, looking 
at the complex nature of this debt, and the implications 
of the latter for international debt relief efforts.
In section 1 of the paper, we look at the current context 
of external debt. We outline first the key features of 
African debt, including its rapid growth and changing 
structure, of which an increasing proportion is held by 
private (especially bond) creditors, as well as Chinese 
creditors. Although the focus of this paper is on all LICs 
(most of whom are African countries), we first focus 
on the public debt of the entire African continent, due 
to its high vulnerability to external public debt distress. 
Section 2 focuses in detail on the main features of 
LICs’ debt, in terms of maturity and concessionality. 
In particular, we discuss the changed composition of 
LICs’ creditors, where the shift to China as a major 
creditor is as sharp in LICs as it is in LMICs and uMICs, 
while there is hardly any increase in the role of private 
creditors. We present our analysis in a detailed dataset, 
which we have elaborated based on information from 
the World Bank International Debt Statistics (IDS: 
DSSI). We also briefly examine the impact of rating 
agencies’ actions on ratings of low-income countries’ 
debt. Section 3 draws policy implications from our data 
analysis and from the broader international discussion 
on debt relief. We conclude that delaying an inevitable 
debt restructuring will leave over-indebted countries 
and their populations worse off, making it extremely 
difficult for countries to meet the SDGs. It will also 
prevent countries from investing in resilience and 
climate-proofing their economies. We recommend 
that all creditors, public and private, should step up 
and provide, where needed, sufficient debt relief 
to help finance investment in a green, inclusive and 
resilient recovery.
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The current context of 
public external debt in 
the developing world
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The COVID-19 pandemic has severely increased 
the risk of a sovereign debt crisis for developing 
countries. public sectors across all countries need to 
drastically increase their fiscal spending and deficits 
to fund additional health and welfare measures and to 
implement the economic recovery required to address 
the challenges brought about by the pandemic. In this 
context, access to additional international financial 
resources is crucial to provide adequate liquidity for 
relatively short-term needs, as well as longer-term 
development finance, particularly for developing 
countries. For those countries whose debt burden is 
excessive or who are insolvent, adequate debt relief is a 
pre-condition both to allow sufficient fiscal space in the 
present and access to new international development 
finance in the future.
We present below unique data focusing mainly on the 
public external debt of LICs. Before doing so, we briefly 
analyse the African public debt context. 
1.1 African debt
As is the case worldwide, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
caused a surge in public financing needs in Africa, as 
governments spend more to mitigate the socioeconomic 
effects of the pandemic. Consequently, in the short term, 
the average debt-to-GDp ratio in Africa is expected to 
increase from 60% in 2019 to more than 70%. Most 
individual countries in Africa are also experiencing 
significant increases in their debt-to-GDp ratios. 
The creditor base for Africa’s debt has been shifting 
away from traditional multilateral and paris Club lenders 
toward commercial creditors and official lenders who 
are not paris Club members. The share of multilateral 
debt in Africa’s total external debt has remained 
relatively stable over the past two decades at around 
30% (see figure 1). The share of bilateral debt in total 
external debt, on the other hand, has fallen by almost 
half in the last two decades. In 2000, bilateral lenders, 
mostly paris Club members, accounted for 52% of 
Africa’s external debt stock, but by the end of 2019 their 
share had fallen to 27% (AfDB, 2021).
Figure 1. Composition of creditors (as % of GDp): all African countries and low-income African countries, 2000 to 2019
Source: AfDB, op cit.
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By contrast, commercial creditors (bondholders and 
commercial banks) have more than doubled their 
share of African debt in the last two decades. In 2000, 
commercial banks, private bondholders and other 
private creditors held a low share of Africa’s external 
debt. That share has grown quickly since 2011, with 
commercial creditors accounting for 40% of Africa’s 
total external debt at the end of 2019 compared with 
17% in 2000 (AfDB, op cit.). 
The top five creditors to Africa since 2015 are 
bondholders (which accounted for 27% of the 
continent’s external debt at the end of 2019), China 
(13%), the World Bank–International Development 
Association (12%), the African Development Bank (7%), 
and other multilateral lenders (7%) (see Figure 2). The 
top five national creditors to Africa are China (13%), 
the united States (4%), France (2.9%), Saudi Arabia 
(2.5%) and the united Kingdom (2.4%). Other top 
creditors include Germany, Japan and Kuwait and uAE 
(see Figure 2). 
International bonds have become a major source of 
funding for African countries, with about 21 countries 
issuing bonds in excess of $155 billion by 2020. 
Eurobond issuances were led by large middle-income 
countries, such as Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria, 
followed by resource-intensive middle-sized countries 
such as Zambia, Angola, and Ghana.
Although private creditors are playing an increasingly 
important role in so-called ‘frontier market economies’ 
or emerging economies, LICs continue to rely mainly 
on official creditors, particularly multilateral and, 
increasingly, non-paris Club members. LICs that do 
not have access to international capital markets have 
continued to rely on multilateral concessional credit. 
There has been a growing shift among these countries 
away from traditional paris Club lenders to non-paris 
Club lenders, notably China (see figure 2).
Figure 2. Top five creditors and top five bilateral creditors to African economies
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1.2 Overall debt situation 
of low-income countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa
Debt sustainability ratings using the Debt Sustainability 
Analysis (DSA) framework indicate that many sub-
Saharan African (SSA) LICs have fallen into debt 
distress in the past decade; and more are expected 
to do so as a result of COVID-19. Rising debt levels in 
the past decade have negatively affected DSA ratings 
for LICs in Africa. Of 38 countries with available DSA 
ratings,1 14 were rated as in high risk of debt distress 
at the end of December 2020 and another six were 
already in debt distress (Figure 3). Sixteen countries 
had moderate risk of debt distress, while two were 
considered at low risk. Safety margins are being eroded 
by COVID-19 and even countries with comfortable 
margins could deplete their buffers during the crisis. 
Moreover, sovereign credit ratings issued by credit 
rating agencies have been downgraded for most 
SSA countries since they entered international capital 
markets. It is more difficult for countries to move from 
lower to higher credit ratings – rating improvements are 
sticky upward while downgrades have been common 
(Griffith-Jones and Kramer, forthcoming, and below). 
In 2010, 12 countries were rated as having a low risk 
of debt distress; ten years later, only three maintained 
that rating. Since 2017, seven LICs have had their DSA 
rating downgraded (AfDB, op cit).
Figure 3. Risk of African countries’ external debt
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The in-depth analysis of external debt of LICs presented 
in this section is based on data from the World Bank 
International Debt Statistics (IDS: DSSI).6 The dataset 
contains detailed information about the time horizon and 
the composition of countries’ external debt, together 
with information about the composition of creditors. We 
extracted data on external public debt for 23 out of 29 
LICs for the period 2010–2019 from the World Bank 
Country and Lending Groups – World Bank Data Help 
Desk.2 We did not find available data for Democratic 
people’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. For the 
list of selected countries (with country codes), please 
refer to Table A1 in the Appendix. Finally, data have been 
complemented with additional data from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The analysis covers 
two periods: 2010–2014 and 2015–2019. Table A4 
in the Appendix offers unique detailed information for 
all creditors (including every bilateral creditor) and by 
quartile of debtor countries.
Our detailed empirical analysis of LIC debt found 
the following:
1) During the last decade, the share of total debt as 
a proportion of gross national income (GNI) has 
grown for both LICs and LMICs (Table 1).
2) private debt is less significant in LICs (less than 
12% of total debt in 2015–2019), than in LMICs, 
where it represents around 25% of total long-term 
debt (Table 1). publicly guaranteed private debt is 
very small for LICs (Table 2).
3) Only five of the 23 LICs in the analysis have 
issued international bonds over the period 2010–
2019, namely Ethiopia (2014), Guinea Bissau, 
Mozambique, Rwanda (2013) and Tajikistan (2017).
4) Long-term external debt is the major component of 
LICs’ external debt, accounting on average for more 
than 80% of the total stock (Figure 5).
5) Concessional debt represents the majority of 
long-term debt, and is relatively stable (Figure 6). 
It increased significantly, almost doubling over the 
period 2010–2019 (Figure 7).
6) The top creditors to LICs in the periods 2010–2014 
and 2015–2019, were the World Bank/IDA, China 
and ‘other multilaterals’, particularly the African 
Development Bank (AfDB). China increased its 
exposure to LICs by more than 130 % between the 
first and second half of the decade (Table 3).
7) If we examine countries by quartile (according to 
income levels), China is present in all quartiles and 
in both periods as an increasingly important creditor. 
Other bilateral creditors present in the second 
period in some quartiles are uK, uS and Venezuela.
2.1 Public debt by income 
category
Table 1 below presents the key information on total 
external public debt by countries’ income categories 
(for countries’ averages, please refer to Table A2 in 
the Appendix).
Table 1 shows that external debt stocks, as a 
percentage of GNI have grown significantly between 
2010–14 and 2015–2019, both for LICs and LMICs. 
There are interesting differences across countries’ 
income groups. First, LICs report a lower share of 
external debt stock as share of GNI across the two 
periods compared to lower-middle income countries 
(LMICs). Second, long-term external debt accounts for 
more than 80% of the total amount of external debt, and 
it is mainly composed of public debt for both country 
groups. Third, private external debt is less prevalent – 
almost one-third of LIC countries do not have any private 
external debt – and of lower quantitative relevance 
compared to public debt. For LICs, private debt only 
accounts for a minimal share of the total external long-
term debt (less than 12% in 2015–2019 of total debt), 
while for LMICs private external debt accounts for 
around 25% of the total external long-term debt in the 
same period. 
2.2 Evolution of LICs’ 
external debt
Table 2 presents the countries’ main characteristics by 
period and quartile relative to the GNI per capita. We 
performed the analysis over two periods: 2010–2014 
and 2015–2019 and created quartiles according to 
countries’ yearly GNI per capita.4 
From Table 2 we observe that, on average, countries 
have reported lower GNI per capita in 2015–2019 than 
in the previous period, but a higher absolute level of 
total GNI. In the second period, countries reported, on 
average, higher external short-term debt, higher public 
external debt and IMF credit. But the share of countries 
issuing private publicly guaranteed debt decreased, 
however, with fewer countries issuing, on average, 
higher amounts. Across the two periods, the average 
interest rate on new external public debt remained 
constant but in the second period countries reported 
much higher interest payments on public debt. This 
is clearly problematic, with interest payments totalling 
more than uS$1.5 billion over the period 2015–2019. 
This is mainly due to the situation of two countries – 
Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which 
reported a steep increase in interest payments, as 
presented in Figure 4 below.
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Number of countries 23 34 23 34
Average external debt stocks (% of GNI) 27.7 43.0 35.5 54.8
External debt stocks, long-term (current uS$ billion) 60.6 273.2 97.0 440.7
External debt stocks, long-term private (current uS$ 
billion)
5.6 81.0 12.8 126.9
External debt stocks, long-term public (current uS$ 
billion)
55.0 192.2 84.2 313.8
External debt stocks, short-term (current uS$ billion) 3.6 32.1 5.5 43.4
External debt stocks, total (current US$ billion)3 70.8 328.4 109.8 505.9
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI. Income group classification comes from the World Bank Country and Lending Groups – 
World Bank Data Help Desk2 
Note: all values reported in the table refer to the sum of countries’ yearly indicators.





2010–2014 2015–2019 2010–2014 2015–2019
GNI per capita (current uS$) 691.8 673.2 – –
GNI (current uS$ billion) 12.4 15.0 284.3 345.6
Total population (billion) 19.7 22.7 452.2 522.8
Average external debt stocks (% of GNI) 27.7 35.5 – –
Total external debt (current uS$ billion) 3.1 4.7 70.8 109.8
External short-term debt (current uS$ billion) 0.156 0.237 3.6 5.5
External long-term public debt  
(current uS$ billion)
2.4 3.7 55.0 84.2
% countries with long-term private publicly 
guaranteed debt
7.0% 4.3% – –
External long-term private publicly guaranteed 
debt (current uS$ million) – if>0
3.0 4.0 5.2 3.6
IMF credit (uS$ billion) 0.286 0.317 6.6 7.3
Interest rate on new external public debt (%)5 1.5% 1.3% – –
Interest payments on external public debt 
(current uS$ million)
37 71 849 1643.2
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI  
Note: all values reported in the table refer to the sum of countries’ yearly indicators. 
N Countries = 23
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2.3 The time horizon of 
external debt 
Information on external debt from the World Bank IDS: 
DSSI dataset are also categorised by the time horizon 
of the debt. The categories in which external debt is 
disaggregated are: short-term debt, long-term debt and 
IMF credit. Short-term debt indicates external debt with 
an original maturity of one year or less while long-term 
debt indicates external debt with more than one year 
of maturity. Finally, IMF credit indicates “members’ 
drawings on the IMF other than amounts drawn against 
the country’s reserve tranche position.”6 Figure 5 
presents the average countries’ stock of external debt, 
by time horizon and by GNI per capita quartile. 
Although all countries except Burkina Faso have short-
term debt,7 the amount reported is generally small, 
as in normal times it is linked mainly to trade credit. 
Over the two periods, countries across all quartiles 
have increased the amount of short-term debt, which, 
interestingly, is the second source of external debt for 
countries in the ‘top 25%’ quartile. While for the ‘bottom 
25%’ quartile in the period 2010–2014, short-term 
debt was only half the level of IMF credit, in the period 
2015–2019 this gap reduced due to both an increase in 
short-term debt and a decrease of IMF credit. 
Long-term external debt is instead the major component 
of LICs’ external debt, accounting on average for more 
than 85% of the total stock. In 2015–2019, countries 
in the ‘bottom 25%’ quartile reported a lower average 
amount of long-term debt, while countries in the 
‘25%–50%’ quartile have almost doubled the average 
stock, countries in the ‘50%–75%’ quartile have almost 
tripled the average stock and countries in the ‘top 25%’ 
quartile have increased the average stock by more than 
one-third. 
Within long-term public external debt, concessional 
debt8 – defined as loans with an original grant element 
of 35% or more – represents a major component of 
LICs’ long-term external debt, as presented in Figure 6 
below. This is of course a positive feature as it implies 
that servicing of debt is relatively low; also, concessional 
loans are often accompanied by long maturities.
Figure 4. Evolution of total interest payments on debt by country – current uS$ billion
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI 
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Figure 5. Time horizon of external public debt by period of analysis and GNI per capita quartile – current uS$ billion
Average yearly total
2010–2014 2015–2019
Short-term Long-term public IMF Credit Short-term Long-term public IMF Credit
3.6 55.0 6.6 5.5 84.2 7.3
Figure 6. Long-term external public debt and concessional debt over the years by GNI per capita quartile – current uS$ billion
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI  
Note: The graph reports the yearly average of countries’ long-term external debt and long-term concessional debt



































































































































   Long-term public debt     Long-term concessional debt
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI  
Note: The graph reports the yearly countries’ average external debt, by GNI per capita quartile
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Concessional debt accounts for the majority of long-
term external debt for almost all LIC groups, except 
for countries in the ‘50–75%’ group after 2014. 
Concessional debt also shows lower volatility compared 
to overall long-term debt, as is particularly evident for 
the ‘bottom 25%’ group in 2015 and for the ‘25–50% 
group in 2015. For the two lowest quartiles of LICs, 
long-term debt is mainly concessional, which implies 
the cost of servicing that debt should be significantly 
lower. Figure 7 shows that the size of concessional debt 
to LICs increased over recent years, as shown in the 
following Figure 7, with the total amount almost doubling 
over the period 2010–2019.
Finally, IMF credit represents the second source of 
external debt for countries in the two lowest quartiles 
and the last source for countries in the group reporting 
the highest GNI per capita. For the period 2010–2014, 
total exposure of IMF towards LICs was just above 
uS$1 billion, which slightly increased over the period 
2015–2019. It is also interesting to note the shift 
of IMF total exposure from the poorest countries 
towards countries in the ‘25–50%’ quartile and 
towards the relatively richer countries; over the period 
2010–2014, the IMF’s total exposure with countries in 
the ‘bottom 25%’ quartile was uS$450 million, while 
over the period 2015–2019 it reduced its exposure to 
uS$350 million, but increased exposure with countries 
in the ‘25–50%’ quartile and in the ‘top 25%’ quartile. 
2.4 Countries and 
international institutions 
that are major creditors of 
LICs
This section investigates which countries and 
institutions are major creditors of LICs, reporting the 
highest stocks of credit over the two periods of analysis. 
Table 3 reports the top five countries or institutions 
by average yearly total credit exposure and by period 
of analysis.
Across the two periods the World Bank has been the 
largest institution by average credit exposure, with 
almost uS$18 billion per year over the first period and 
almost uS$26 billion over the second period. China is 
the second largest creditor by average credit exposure 
per year in both periods, with its exposure more than 
doubling in 2015–2019. Finally, other multilateral 
institutions and other creditors increased their exposure 
sharply. Figure 8 below reports the top five countries 
and institutions in terms of yearly average credit towards 
all countries included in this analysis.10
Figure 7. Total LICs’ long-term concessional debt by year – current uS$ billion
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI  
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The World Bank has been the largest creditor for 
the group of LICs, with an overall average yearly 
exposure of more than uS$17 billion during the period 
2010–2014; this decreased by roughly uS$8 billion in 
2015–2019. Among the other important lenders, China 
is the second largest creditor with its exposure more 
than doubling across the two periods, from a yearly 
average of uS$7 billion over the period 2010–2014 
to uS$16.4 billion over the period 2015–2019. Other 
multilateral organisations are the third largest group 
of LICs’ creditors, with an average yearly exposure 
of uS$6.4 billion in the period 2010–2014, which 
Table 3. Top public and private lenders to LICs by period of analysis – current uS$ billion
yEARLy ToTAL AvERAgE InDIvIDuAL CounTRIES’ DEbT
2010–2014
1 World Bank–IDA 17.9 0.80
2 China 6.9 0.37
3 Other multilaterals 6.6 0.28
8 Multiple lenders9 1.5 0.3
Others 25.5 0.1
2015–2019
1 World Bank–IDA 25.5 1.14
2 China 16.4 0.86
3 Other multilaterals 8.7 0.37
14 Multiple lenders 1.4 0.30
Others 34.1 0.17
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI  
Note: N Countries = 23
Figure 8. Top five creditors’ public credit stock, by period 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS: DSSI  
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increased to uS$8.5 billion in the period 2015–2019. 
The African Development Bank is the fourth largest 
creditor to LICs, with an average yearly exposure similar 
to that of the other multilateral organisations. Finally, 
Russia (for the period 2010–2014) and the united 
Kingdom (for the period 2015–2019) complete the list 
of top five creditors of LICs.
There is a specific problem with Chinese debt, 
especially via the infrastructure loan instrument 
deployed by the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) 
and China Eximbank known as resource-financed 
infrastructure (RFI): the form of payment may make it 
more difficult to restructure debt, and certainly makes 
unilateral action by the debtor impossible. under RFI a 
government pledges future revenues from a resource 
project to repay an existing construction loan, linking 
infrastructure building and resource sales. The size of 
China’s overseas RFI is significant. Over half of CDB 
and China Eximbank’s very large infrastructure lending 
has been in the form of RFI (Griffith-Jones et al.; Xu et 
al., forthcoming; see also Gelpern et al., 2021 for a very 
interesting and detailed analysis of these development 
banks’ contracts, and the problems associated with 
them including the one discussed here, and also the 
issue of transparency of these debts). 
There are two channels through which RFI protects 
itself against non-payment. First, Chinese development 
banks directly fund construction companies rather than 
borrowing governments. Second, the resource revenue 
goes directly to an independent escrow account 
established to service the debt of infrastructure loans. 
This reduces flexibility for debtor governments with 
debt servicing difficulties (eg due to commodity price 
shocks, and most recently COVID-19). These shocks 
are not the fault of the country. part of borrowers’ export 
revenue goes automatically into an escrow account, 
for repaying their infrastructure loans. If the country 
experiences an external shock, it is very difficult for it 
to defer or reduce payments to creditors to enable it to 
use its scarce foreign exchange for essential imports. 
Reducing the use of escrow accounts in future Chinese 
loans for infrastructure would allow more flexibility to 
debtor countries for future debt restructuring. But this 
could reduce Chinese development banks’ willingness 
to make new loans.
2.5 The role of 
international bondholders 
in recent years
As discussed above, African countries have borrowed 
significant amounts on the bond markets in the past 
decade. However, only five out of the 23 countries in 
the analysis have issued international bonds over the 
period 2010–2019, namely Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, 
Mozambique, Rwanda and Tajikistan. Ethiopia issued its 
first sovereign bonds to international lenders in 2014, for 
a total amount of uS$1 billion, exposure that remained 
constant up to 2019. Guinea-Bissau has reported the 
lowest stock of sovereign bonds; these were initially 
issued in 2013 and totalled only uS$130 million 
in 2019. Mozambique also issued its first bond in 
2013, for an overall amount of uS$800 million. This 
debt decreased to uS$730 million three years later 
and remained constant until 2019. Rwanda, issued 
its first international sovereign bonds in 2013 for 
uS$400 million; this amount increased marginally in 
2018. Finally, Tajikistan issued its international bonds in 
2017 for an amount equal to uS$500 million.
In Table A4 in the Appendix, we have detailed all the 
creditors (including all creditor countries and categories 
of creditor) for the two periods, (2010–2014 and 
2015–2019) and for the four quartiles of LICs by 
income levels. We believe this table could be useful for 
the detailed design of debt relief policies
2.6 The role of rating 
agencies 
There are three major international credit rating 
agencies (CRAs): S&p Global, Moody’s and Fitch. 
Over recent years, these institutions have become more 
important for developing countries. While, coverage 
for LICs remains limited, as shown in Table 4, they 
are increasingly rating other developing countries and 
emerging economies and have become more important 
compared to during previous cycles of sovereign debt 
crises, such as the Latin American debt crisis in the 
1980s. Then, only a few countries had a sovereign rating 
at all. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, only South 
Africa had a rating at the beginning of the 21st century 
(Griffith-Jones and Kraemer, forthcoming, op cit).
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One peculiarity of recent developments, following 
the onset of the COVID-19 crisis is that, as shown 
in Figure 7, CRAs have almost exclusively (and in 
the case of S&p exclusively) downgraded emerging 
markets and developing economies. What explains 
these differences? It is true that rich, diversified 
economies are more resilient to shocks than poorer, 
more vulnerable countries. However, it is also true 
that the shock delivered by COVID-19 was not evenly 
felt across economies. In fact, the hit to growth and 
public debt accumulation have been twice as large for 
advanced economies as for emerging and developing 
economies. Given that context, it is not at all clear why 
rich countries’ ratings remained largely untouched 
even as their poorer counterparts were subject to more 
extensive downgrades. More analysis is required to 
solve this puzzle. However, as reported in the press, it 
would appear that regulators from developed economies 
have put pressure on CRAs to not downgrade 
developed economies and that this may have had some 
effect (personal communication).
The key point is that developing economies, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa are concerned that if they enter 
into debt relief discussions, including in the context 
of the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments 
beyond DSSI” (CF) discussed below, they will be 
downgraded by the CRAs. This is illustrated by the 
recent experience of Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s rating was 
lowered following its request for ‘treatment’ of its public 
debt under the G20 CF. under the Framework, which 
was agreed on 13 November 2020, countries that had 
been eligible for debt suspension under the DSSI can 
request a more profound restructuring of the debt, 
implying debt reduction. A condition for participation 
in the CF is “broad creditor participation including the 
private sector”.11 By applying for CF debt treatment, 
Ethiopia has thus signalled that it is willing to approach 
its private creditors for debt restructuring. Although 
that restructuring has not yet happened, and may never 
happen, the CRAs consider it has become more likely 
(personal communication with former senior analysist at 
a major rating agency). 
This apparent link between developing countries 
entering into CF discussions and being downgraded 
by CRAs is unfair. However, developing country 
regulators have relatively weak influence over CRAs. 
At the same time the concerns that CRA downgrades 
may undermine the ability of developing countries to 
access international capital markets in the future could 
be overblown as low-income countries have fairly 
limited access to private capital markets (especially 
bond markets). 
Only ten out of the 23 LICs in this analysis have been 
rated by at least one of the three most important rating 
agencies (Fitch, S&p and Moody’s). Across these 
countries, Ethiopia and uganda are reporting relatively 
higher ratings, while for Madagascar and Mali (and 
Mozambique for Fitch) country ratings were interrupted, 
due to a worsening of their situations. 
Figure 9. Sovereign downgrades by rating agency and country group – in cumulative notches,  










 Fitch Moody’s S&p
¢ Advanced economies  ¢ Emerging markets and developing economies
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Table 4. Country ratings
CounTRy FITCh S&P mooDy’S
BFA Burkina Faso BBB- (2017)
TCD Congo, Dem. Rep. CCC+ (2019)
ETH Ethiopia B (2018) B (2014) B1 (2018)
MDG Madagascar NR11 (2009)
MLI Mali NR (2008)
MOZ Mozambique RD12 (2018) CCC+ (2019) Caaa3 (2016)
RWA Rwanda B+ (2014) B+ (2019) B2 (2018)
TJK Tajikistan B- (2017) B3 (2017)
TGO Togo BBB- (2019)
uGA uganda B+ (2018) B (2014) B2 (2018)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration
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3 
Looking forward
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Debt relief initiatives will be required for all those 
countries facing unsustainable debts, both because of 
their increasing debt burdens before COVID-19, and the 
additional debt burden caused by the pandemic. Based 
on our analysis of the changes in the levels of debt, and 
especially in the structure of the debt, we present the 
following conclusions and policy recommendations. 
Need for large-scale and timely 
debt relief
A key lesson from the history of debt crises is that debt 
relief should be on a sufficiently large scale to deal with 
the debt overhang problem, and should be timely to 
avoid unnecessary damage to development, investment, 
employment and poverty reduction. Indeed, as we 
learned from previous debt crises doing ‘too little, too 
late’ would set back development in debtor countries, 
for up to a decade, and would severely reverse progress 
on the SDGs. It would also reduce debtor countries’ 
ability to pay future debt servicing which, in turn, is 
harmful for creditors. 
Debt relief and inclusive sustainable 
development
In the light of the climate and nature emergencies 
facing the planet, with their effects disproportionately 
impacting low-income countries, a link should be made 
between debt relief and sustainable and inclusive 
development (see, for example, Volz et al. 2020, and 
Steele and patel 2020). Making this link would enable 
funds released by debt relief to be channelled towards 
investment in climate mitigation, adaptation and 
resilience and biodiversity conservation, as well as into 
helping make the transition to a green economy a just 
one. It should also increase the willingness of public 
and private creditors to provide debt relief, in a more 
timely manner and at a more significant scale, if some 
of the freed resources are committed to green and 
inclusive transformations.
Growth of private creditors
On the structure of debt, our analysis shows, in the 
case of Africa as a whole, that private creditors have 
grown significantly in importance during the 2000s; but 
this presents a challenge in terms of debt relief efforts. 
Sufficient and fair debt reduction (among creditors) for 
African countries needing significant debt relief requires 
equal treatment of public and private creditors. This 
would prevent relief given by public creditors being used 
for servicing debt to private creditors, thus allowing 
the relief to be channelled towards facilitating green 
and inclusive recovery and long-term development. 
Securing debt relief from private creditors may require 
both ‘carrots and sticks’ The ‘carrots’ may include 
some type of credit enhancement, for example, from 
the World Bank-IDA or the African Development Bank, 
to encourage private creditors to provide some level 
of debt relief. ‘Sticks’ could involve institutions like the 
IMF encouraging countries with unsustainable debts 
to which they will provide loans to seek equivalent debt 
reduction from both public and private creditors, at the 
levels needed to make their debt sustainable.
This issue of private debt, particularly debt owed to 
bondholders is, however, less significant for LICs, 
both in Africa and globally. Their private debt for LICs 
has stayed broadly stable as a share of the total, at 
around 10%, in the last decade. Only five of the 23 
LIC countries included in our analysis have issued 
international bonds over the period 2010–2019. 
However, for those five countries (which include 
Ethiopia, clearly now in debt difficulties), there may be 
a case for also including those bondholders in any debt 
relief – especially as the interest rate linked to servicing 
the bonds tends to be much higher than that paid to 
official creditors, particularly as much of LIC debt to 
official creditors is concessional. But for most LICs, and 
specifically those that have not raised bonds, the issue 
of debt relief from private creditors is less important, and 
it may be more effective to focus on public creditors.
Rise of China as a major creditor
As regards the issue of public creditors, both for Africa 
as a whole and for LICs globally, the most important 
change is the rapid rise of China as a major creditor. 
For Africa as a whole, China is the top bilateral creditor 
(with 13% of total credit owed by African countries) 
and the second largest creditor after bondholders. 
Furthermore, China more than doubled its already high 
exposure to LICs between the first and second half of 
the decade. As for the whole of Africa, China is also the 
second largest creditor for LICs (see detailed analysis 
above), but in this case after the World Bank-IDA. 
Other, more traditional bilateral creditors (like the paris 
Club members) have become relatively less important in 
terms of share of total debt, both for Africa and for LICs.
Consequently, it is essential that any significant debt 
relief initiative includes Chinese creditors in equivalent 
ways to other public creditors. However, this could be 
difficult as China does not formally participate in the 
paris Club although it is increasingly coordinating with 
it. It is also positive that China has been active in the 
Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), and has 
supported the G20 Common Framework. 
As discussed, one specific problem with Chinese debt, 
especially via the resource-financed infrastructure 
(RFI) loan (whereby a government pledges future 
revenue from a resource project to repay an existing 
infrastructure loan), is that the form of payment can 
make restructuring the loan difficult. part of the 
borrower’s export revenue goes automatically into an 
escrow account, for repaying their infrastructure loans. 
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If the country experiences an external shock, such as 
COVID-19, and needs to defer or reduce payments 
to creditors so it can use scarce foreign exchange for 
essential imports, it is very difficult for them to do so.
Shortcomings of G20 Debt Service 
Suspension Initiative and Common 
Framework 
The G20’s DSSI and Common Framework for Debt 
Treatment do not go far enough to address debt 
problems in countries with unsustainable debt. The 
Common Framework falls short on three counts (see 
Volz et al., op cit.):
1. The Framework only applies to low-income 
countries and some lower middle-income countries. 
However, many other middle-income countries 
have been hit hard by the COVID-19 crisis. Of the 
124 million people pushed into extreme poverty in 
2020 as a result of the pandemic, the World Bank 
estimates that eight out of ten were in middle- 
income countries.
2. The framework deals with countries’ debt problems 
on a case-by-case basis and fails to address the 
problem that participating nations fear, of being 
denied market access by private creditors if they 
request debt relief. Since the start of the pandemic, 
95% of all downgrades by the three leading global 
rating agencies were of developing countries, even 
though developed countries suffered larger declines 
in their GDp and larger increases in their debt-to-
GDp ratios. This explains why developing countries 
may have reasons to fear exclusion from access to 
private capital markets. It should be emphasised, 
though, that given the small scale of private debt, in 
the total debt of most LICs, it may not be a priority to 
seek debt relief from private creditors. 
3. The new framework does not require creditors 
and debtor countries to commit to align at least 
part of the additional fiscal space freed by debt 
relief with globally shared climate, nature and 
development goals. Countries failing to invest in 
much-needed resilience and adaptation, as well as 
development, will see their future debt sustainability 
undermined further.
In summary, we recommend the following approach to 
improve debt sustainability. 
• All low-income and middle-income countries are 
supported to participate in debt restructuring, if their 
debt is deemed to be unsustainable.
• When assessing debt sustainability, the analysis 
integrates climate and other sustainability risks, 
as well as financing needs for climate adaptation 
and mitigation.
• Governments receiving debt relief commit to reforms 
and investments that align their policies and budgets 
with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the paris Agreement.
• private creditors accept a reduction in their debt 
holdings as part of restructuring. This could be 
swapped with ’green recovery bonds’ with Brady-type 
credit enhancement or guarantees – suitably adapted 
to current circumstances, which could be provided by 
a multilateral development bank. 
Delaying an inevitable debt restructuring will leave 
over-indebted countries and their populations worse off, 
making it extremely difficult for them to meet the SDGs. 
Not only will governments fail to provide the social 
safeguards for their populations needed during this 
terrible health and social crisis. It will also prevent them 
from investing in resilience and in climate-proofing their 
economies. The international community should step 
up and provide, where needed, sufficient debt relief to 
invest in a green, inclusive and resilient recovery.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of countries analysed
LIC CounTRIES
AFG Afghanistan MDG Madagascar
BFA Burkina Faso MWI Malawi
BDI Burundi MLI Mali
CAF Central African Republic MOZ Mozambique
COD Chad NER Niger
TCD Congo, Dem. Rep. RWA Rwanda
ETH Ethiopia SLE Sierra Leone
GMB Gambia, The SOM Tajikistan
GIN Guinea TJK Togo
GNB Guinea-Bissau TGO uganda
HTI Haiti uGA Yemen, Rep.
LBR Liberia










External debt stocks (% of GNI) 27.7 43.0 35.5 54.8
External debt stocks, long-term 
(current uS$ billion)
2.6 8.1 4.2 13.0
(2.9) (10.8) (5.6) (15.5)
External debt stocks, long-term 
private (current uS$ billion)
0.7 3.6 1.3 4.9
(1.2) (4.9) (1.9) (6.2)
External debt stocks, long-term 
public (current uS$ billion)
2.4 5.7 3.7 9.2
(2.6) (8.7) (5.0) (12.4)
External debt stocks, Short-term 
(current uS$ billion)
0.2 1.1 0.3 1.4
(0.2) (1.7) (0.3) (2.2)
External debt stocks, total 
(current US$ billion)
3.1 9.8 4.8 14.9
(3.1) (13.2) (5.8) (18.3)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS:DSSI. Income group classification come from the World Bank Country and Lending Groups – 
World Bank Data Help Desk 
Note: all values reported in the table refer to averages across countries’ yearly indicators. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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Table A3. List of countries by period of analysis and GNI quartile
2010–2014
boTTom 25% 25%–50% 50%–75% ToP 25%
Burundi Afghanistan Burkina Faso Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep. CAR13 Gambia, The uganda14
Ethiopia Guinea-Bissau15 Guinea Haiti
Madagascar Liberia Mali Tajikistan





boTTom 25% 25%–50% 50%–75% ToP 25%
Burundi Afghanistan19 Burkina Faso20 Guinea21
CAR22 Chad23 Ethiopia24 Haiti
Malawi Congo, Dem. Rep.25 Guinea-Bissau26 Mali27
Madagascar28 Liberia29 Gambia, The Tajikistan
Mozambique30 Niger Rwanda31 Yemen, Rep.32
Sierra Leone33 Togo uganda34
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Table A4. Debt exposure counterpart countries, by period of analysis and GNI quartile – current uS$ billion



















2.676 1.694 0.494 1.188 1.907 3.618 0.996 1.327







0.582 0.647 0.608 0.329 0.282
(0.012) (0.033) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012)
Austria 0.014 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)




Belgium 0.019 0.004 0.026 0.03 0.026 0.007 0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.031) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001)
Bondholders 1 0.727 0.437 0.878 0.825 1.188 0.725
(0.000) (0.589) (0.601) (0.405) (0.519)
Brazil 0.449 0.04 0.093 0.042
(0.031) (0.006) (0.160) (0.049)
Canada 0.177 0 0.127 0 0.072
(0.037) (0.031)
China 3.697 2.194 0.843 1.77 0.892 8.418 1.525 4.056






0 0.012 0.003 0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Denmark 0.045 0.065 0.082 0.038 0.046 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.017) (0.052) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000)
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Egypt 0.14 0.005 0.05 0.005
(0.020) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
France 0.414 0.301 0.127 0.233 0.387 0.387 0.133 0.345
(0.132) (0.051) (0.113) (0.055) (0.150) (0.081) (0.029) (0.273)
Germany, 
Fed. Rep. of
0.011 0.062 0.031 0.005 0.033 0.02 0.026
(0.015) (0.054) (0.043) (0.001) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012)
Greece 0.001 0.002 0.004
(0.002)
Hong Kong 0
Hungary 0.001 0.001 0.001
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0.725 0.536 0.138 0.311 0.33 0.551 0.051 0.25





0.009 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002)
Ireland 0.059 0.057
(0.003)
Israel 0.008 0.099 0.148
(0.039)
Italy 0.26 0.017 0.001 0.041 0.287 0.048 0.136
(0.049) (0.022) (0.000) (0.033) (0.242) (0.001) (0.214)
Japan 0.065 0.255 0.023 0.097 0.063 0.366 0.296 0.242
(0.124) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.214) (0.033) (0.044)
Kuwait 0.223 0.2 0.172 0.187 0.321 0.291 0.281 0.302
(0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.047) (0.018) (0.077) (0.014) (0.055)
Libya 0.381 0.292 0.178 0.239 0.214 0.318 0.292 0.084
(0.097) (0.119) (0.215) (0.124) (0.170) (0.215) (0.017) (0.116)
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1.234 0.71 0.078 0.932 0.229 0.044 0.005 0.039
(0.162) (0.586) (0.129) (0.492) (0.131) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019)
Neth. Antilles 0.001
(0.000)
Netherlands 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Niger 0 0
(0.000)






0.373 0.676 0.428 0.451 0.344 0.479 0.264 0.284
(0.050) (0.199) (0.243) (0.151) (0.266) (0.182) (0.037) (0.179)
Other 
Multilaterals
1.387 1.394 0.837 2.014 1.988 2.431 2.214 2.614




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
portugal 0.072 0.636 0.684 0.223 0.514
(0.122) (0.048) (0.139) (0.384) (0.374)
Russian 
Federation
0.245 0.549 0.902 0.95 0.131 0.349 1.163 0.91
(0.001) (0.491) (0.118) (0.118) (0.123) (0.418) (0.030) (0.418)
Saudi Arabia 0.1 0.162 0.146 0.188 0.276 0.468 0.985 1.244
(0.013) (0.051) (0.019) (0.033) (0.011) (0.587) (0.538) (0.532)
Serbia 0.018 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.017
(0.013) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
South Africa 0.009 0.082 0.134
(0.029)
Spain 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.012 0.027 0.016 0.029 0.016
(0.021) (0.010) (0.006) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.000)
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Sweden 0 0.148 0 0.119
(0.024)
Switzerland 0.057 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.804 0.227
(0.074) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.193) (0.438)








0.132 0.026 0.008 0.024 0.012 0.023 0.007 0.021
(0.078) (0.043) (0.006) (0.042) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.017)
united 
Kingdom
0.006 0.572 0.622 1.136 0.313 0.797 1.068 0.108
(0.002) (0.356) (0.669) (0.483) (0.701) (0.662) (0.176)
united States 1.118 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.038 1.33 0.107 0.36








6.059 5.274 1.83 3.539 4.315 10.525 5.013 5.821
(0.882) (1.069) (1.003) (0.489) (1.031) (3.137) (0.868) (3.550)
World 19.7 16.6 7.5 13.5 12.6 33.0 15.2 21.2
(3.4) (3.4) (3.7) (1.6) (3.9) (7.5) (2.9) (10.0)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using IDS:DSSI.  
Note: Table A4 reports the list of creditors and their total average yearly exposure, by GNI quartile and period. Standard deviation in 
parenthesis.
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Endnotes
 1 DSA ratings are performed under the Debt 
Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework, carried 
out by the International Monetary Fund. 
 2 World Bank Country and Lending Groups – World 
Bank Data Help Desk .https://datahelpdesk.
worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-
world-bank-country-and-lending-group
 3 The discrepancy between the sum of long term and 
short-term debt and total external debt stock is due 
to IMF credit, which is not included in this table.
 4 For the complete list of countries within each GNI 
quartile by period, please refer to Table A2 in 
the Appendix.
 5 Average interest rate on all new public and publicly 
guaranteed loans contracted during the year.
 6 https://databank.worldbank.org/source/
international-debt-statistics:-dssi. (accessed on 
27/01/2021)
 7 For short-term debt, it is not possible to distinguish 
between the public and private nature of the debtor. 
 8 Concessional debt indicates the amount of aid 
received from official lenders at concessional 
terms defined by OECD or by the major multilateral 
development banks (IADB, Asian DB, African DB, 
etc.).
 9 The category “Multiple lenders” refers to the 
syndicated commercial bank loans where multiple 
banks are involved.
10 For the top five countries and institutions in terms 
of yearly average credit towards all countries part 
of this analysis by quartile of GNI per capita, please 




12 NR refers to countries for which the rating has 
been interrupted.
13 RD refers to countries for which the rating has 
been interrupted.
14 In 2013 and 2014, Central African Republic was in 
the “Bottom 25%” GNI quartile.
15 In 2010, uganda was in the “Bottom 25%” 
GNI quartile.
16 In 2010 and 2011, Guinea-Bissau was in the 
“50%–75%” GNI quartile.
17 In 2010, Malawi was in the “25%–50%” GNI 
quartile. 
18 In 2010, Mozambique was in the “25%–50%” GNI 
quartile; in 2012 and 2014 was in the “50%–75%” 
GNI quartile.
19 In 2012, Niger was in the “Bottom 25%” 
GNI quartile.
20 In 2018 and 2019, Afghanistan was in the “Bottom 
25%” GNI quartile
21 In 2015 and 2017, Burkina Faso was in the “25%–
50%” GNI quartile. 
22 In 2016, Guinea was in the “50%–75%” 
GNI quartile.
23 In 2018, Central African Republic was in the 
“25%–50%” GNI quartile.
24 In 2015 and 2016, Chad was in the “50%–75%” 
GNI quartile.
25 In 2019, Ethiopia was in the “Top 25%” GNI quartile
26 In 2015 and 2017, Congo Dem. Rep. was in the 
“Bottom 25%” GNI quartile
27 In 2015, Guinea-Bissau was in the “25%–50%” 
GNI quartile.
28 In 2015, Mali was in the “50%–75%” GNI quartile.
29 In 2017, Madagascar was in the “25%–50%” 
GNI quartile.
30 In 2015, Liberia was in the “50%–75%” 
GNI quartile.
31 In 2015, Mozambique was in the “25%–50%” 
GNI quartile.
32 In 2016, Rwanda was in the “Top 25%” 
GNI quartile.
33 In 2015, Yemen, Rep. was in the “50%–75%” 
GNI quartile.
34 In 2015 and 2019, Sierra Leone was in the “25%–
50%” GNI quartile.
35 In 2015, uganda was in the “Top 25%” 
GNI quartile.
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Abbreviations and 
acronyms
CBD Chinese Development Bank
CF Common Framework (G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI)
COVID-19 Novel coronavirus 2019
CRA credit rating agency
DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis (World Bank Group & IMF)
DSSI Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20)
GDp gross domestic product
GNI gross national income
IDA International Development Association (World Bank)
IMF International Monetary Fund
LIC low-income country
LMIC lower middle-income country
MIC middle-income country
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
uMIC upper middle-income country
WDI World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Knowledge 
Products
IIED is a policy and action research 
organisation. We promote sustainable 
development to improve livelihoods 
and protect the environments on which 
these livelihoods are built. We specialise 
in linking local priorities to global 
challenges. IIED is based in London and 
works in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the 
Middle East and the pacific, with some 
of the world’s most vulnerable people. 
We work with them to strengthen their 
voice in the decision-making arenas that 
affect them — from village councils to 
international conventions.
International Institute for Environment and Development
235 High Holborn, Holborn, London WC1V 7DN, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 3463 7399
www.iied.org
The public debt of low-income countries is increasing significantly, 
with the ratio of public debt service costs to government tax 
revenue likely to exceed 30% in a third of low-income countries. 
This could reduce their ability to respond to the COVID-19 
pandemic, and to lead an economic recovery that responds to 
climate change and supports the Sustainable Development Goals. 
Rapid and sufficient international debt relief for countries that need 
it is therefore an urgent priority. This needs to take into account the 
changed structure of debt and the diversity of lenders. An important 
change in the structure of this debt is that both Chinese and private 
creditors, especially bondholders, have rapidly increased their share 
of credit to emerging economies. 
This paper analyses the extent of the growing debt crisis in low-
income economies – particularly in Africa, its complex and diverse 
nature, and the implications for international debt relief efforts. It 
is part of a series of publications from a collaborative research 
initiative between IIED and IDRC on the triple crisis of debt, climate 
and nature.
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